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Robots and Immigrants:
Employment, Precarisation and the
Art of Neoliberal Governance
Kostas Maronitis
1 Employment is one of the defining topics of contemporary economies and societies.
Prosperity, education, equality, well-being and overall social and political progress are
largely  imagined  through  the  prism  of  employment.  Qualitative  differences  in
employment regarding income and location constitute a powerful metric system for
evaluating  education,  cultural  capital  and  social  mobility.  Most importantly,
employment  has  become  synonymous  with  existential  anxieties  concerning  social
hierarchy,  identity  and  self-worth.  However,  employment  has  never  been  more
precarious  and  employees  have  never  felt  more  insecure.  Fixed  and  zero-hours
contracts,  low  incomes  and  continuous  corporate  restructurings  are  permanent
features of the present political and economic landscape. These features can either be
justified  as  a  means  to  overcome low productivity  in  capitalist  societies  or  can  be
explained as a manifestation of dysfunctional economies. 
2 Arguments about low productivity,  inefficient labour force,  and lack of  appropriate
skills in the UK labour market have generated strong socio-political responses: from
enthusiasm about the implementation and economic benefits of Artificial Intelligence
(AI)  and  automation  to  sectors  of  the  economy  previously  immune  to  such
technological  changes,  to wider scepticism about massive loss of  jobs and lack of  a
transition period for workers to acquire new skills for a new technological capitalist
environment. At the same time, Britain’s insecure position within the world economy
due to the result of the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) and to
the subsequent negotiations with EU officials have given rise to business demands for
sustaining the current rates of immigrant labour force in the British economy. More
specifically, these demands focus on the need for cheap and/or low-skilled immigrant
labour in the service and agriculture sectors for a competitive and growing economy.
The  competitiveness  of  the  economy  and  national  living  standards  appear  to  be
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interdependent with an uninterrupted flow of immigrants from the EU and elsewhere,
usually defined by low salaries, elastic working hours, and limited rights. 
3 Whilst  there  is  a  growing  body  of  research  which  convincingly  examines  the
intellectual history of automation via the work of Marx (2004) and the Italian operaismo
movement (Virno 2004; Berardi 2017) as well as the working conditions and rights of
immigrant workers, there is very little on the ideological and political infrastructure
that brings those two seemingly disparate discourses together. In this article, I argue
that automation and demands for low-skilled immigrant labour are not only part of a
political  and  economic  agenda  dealing  exclusively  with  economic  growth  and
productivity but also of a conscious attempt to produce a subject best suited to fulfil
this agenda. Considering those two discourses, the article raises the following question:
is there a connection between contemporary economic imaginaries of employment and
productivity and specific modes of political governance? 
4 The empirical material of this article derives,  on the one hand, from economic and
business  reports  dealing  with  the  advent  of  AI  and  automation  and  its  impact  on
productivity and employment and, on the other hand, from reports putting forward
the argument that the flow of immigrant labour is integral to economic growth and
prosperity.  More specifically,  the article  will  engage with relevant  details  from the
Autumn Budget presented by the UK Government to the House of Commons in 2017;
reports  from PricewaterhouseCoopers  (Berriman 2017);  the  World  Economic  Forum
(Gray 2016); the International Transport Forum (2017); the Future of Work Commission
(2017); the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Rolfe 2016; Rolfe and
Hudson-Sharpe 2016); the Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers (2017); and the
National Farmers Union (2017).
5 For the purpose of avoiding a reductionist and economics-centred understanding of the
discourses  of  technological  displacement  and  low-skilled  immigrant  labour
respectively, the article has to confront the socio-political devices which contribute to
the detachment of the economy from politics and society and to the reification of terms
and  concepts  such  as  productivity,  training  and  competition.  The  analysis  of  the
empirical material is not limited to questions over the dominant reading of reports,
policies and public statements but extends to the way these discourses contribute to an
all-encompassing art of neoliberal governance. This article provides an analysis of the
narratives of  the aforementioned reports in order to discover common themes and
salient  socio-political  constructs.  In  particular,  this  article  describes  the  dominant
terms and themes featuring in the reports, policies and statements and then identifies
the ways in which they are culturally and historically specific, and how they relate to
each other; it reveals the commonalities that exist between the data, and then aims to
produce generalised knowledge of neoliberalism and governance based on the selected
data. 
6 The article is  organised as follows: the first section will  focus on the meaning(s) of
neoliberalism  as  an  economic  system  and  political  logic  and  will  establish  its
relationship with the state. The second and third sections will focus on the content and
ideological implications of the reports and policies regarding automation of labour and
low-skilled  immigrant  labour.  The  fourth  section  will  bring  the  discourses  of
automation and  low-skilled  immigrant  labour  together  under  the  concept  of  homo
œconomicus and  will  examine  their  points  of  convergence  and  divergence  by
considering qualitative differences of precarity as an art of neoliberal governance. 
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The State of/in Neoliberalism
7 Any discussion about neoliberalism as a system of political and economic organisation
needs  to  consider  the  ambiguous  relationship  between the  state  and the  economy.
Despite  its  dominance  as  a  political  and  economic  order,  neoliberalism  is  hard  to
define.  As  Jessop  (2012)  notes,  neoliberalism  is  more  often  used  by  critics  of
contemporary capitalist systems than by its proponents. In fact, Jessop refers to the
impossibility of talking about neoliberalism as a singular and coherent term and the
need to  acknowledge multiple  forms and manifestations of  neoliberalism.  However,
there exist two permanent features in neoliberalism in all its manifestations. First, it
aspires to expand the mechanisms of competitive markets to all aspects of social and
political life. Second, it has a problematic and occasionally hostile relationship with the
state. If the state prohibits the expansion of the market and, by association, individual
freedom, then its powers need to be either minimised or adjusted to new economic and
political realities. 
8 Initially,  the  state  was  seen  as  counterproductive  or  even  threatening  to  capital
accumulation and economic growth. Theoretical economist Ludwig von Mises (1998)
notably equated state intervention in economic affairs with socialism and effectively
with  the  loss  of  individual  freedom.  For  Mises,  the  formulation  of  a  middle  way
between  consumer  democracies  and  state  intervention  is  socially  and  politically
hazardous, mainly due to the detrimental effects state control has on the choice and
actions  of  the  consumer  citizen.  State  intervention,  according  to  Mises,  creates
dependent beings lacking imagination and, most importantly, entrepreneurial skills.
Individuals are perfectly capable of pursuing their interests without the help of the
state and all economic science and activity can be stripped down to basic human action
— a “praxeology” in Mises’ lexicon.
9 As soon as we start considering contemporary forms of neoliberalism and neoliberal
practices, political theorisations permeated by state phobia appear naïve and parochial.
Mises’ theorisation prevents us from understanding how the state coexists with the
autonomy of the market and the individual pursuit of interest and freedom. In the final
analysis, the issue at stake is not how to minimise the operation of the state but rather
how to deploy and legitimise specific governmental actions and policies for supporting
and reproducing the pivotal role of the market in all socio-political relations. Contrary
to the laissez-faire economics and prevalent state phobia, Friedrich A. Hayek (2011:331)
argued for a “permanent legal framework which enables the individual to plan with a
degree  of  confidence  and  which  reduces  human  uncertainty  as  much  as  possible”.
Hayek’s references to law and human uncertainty indicate that neoliberalism should
not necessarily be seen as a destructive force threatening established institutions while
imposing the rule of the market. Most importantly, Hayek’s argument points out to the
“denaturalisation” of both markets and competition (Gertenbach 2017; Foucault, 2004).
Competing in global and national markets cannot and should not be perceived as some
form of a primordial act that has been tamed and distorted by state regulation but
rather as a political artifice whose function is to create a specific code of conduct and
then evaluate this conduct according to specific benchmarks such as economic growth
and profit maximisation. 
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10 Following the theoretical elaborations of Foucault (2004), Brown (2005) and Dardot and
Laval (2013), neoliberalism should also be seen as productive in terms of establishing
new  social  relations  and  new  ways  of  living.  Neoliberalism  delineates  competition
between workers, the unemployed, policymakers and technological forces as a normal
socio-political condition in which all  social inequalities are legitimised on condition
that the market dictates the rules of the competition. Part of neoliberalism’s productive
character  is  the  transformation of  the  state  into  an ally  and an enabler  of  market
competition  by  designing  and  implementing  policies  aspiring  to  create  the  ideal
political and economic conditions for profit maximisation. The main criticism directed
towards the state is its general lack of efficiency and entrepreneurial spirit. In turn the
state  needs  to  respond  to  these  criticisms  by  directing  its  focus  from  welfare  to
enterprise and to appear as an equal partner in the implementation of the agenda of
competitiveness and economic growth. This new “‘disenchanted’ conception of public
action” (Dardot and Laval 2013: 217) is legitimised by the state’s commitment to the
common good. The latter mirrors the values and aspirations of neoliberalism, of course,
and  it  is  usually  understood  as  a  series  of  abstract  economic  indices  such  as  high
productivity,  low  unemployment,  trained  and  efficient  labour  and,  ultimately,  a
growing economy. 
11 If and when the doctrine of the competitive market fails to deliver economic growth,
higher productivity and a more efficient labour force, it is because the state has not
been  supportive  enough  of  corporations  and  is  not  in  tune  with  the  free-market
doctrine.  The  discourses  of  technological  displacement  and  low-skilled  immigrant
labour have been developed as part of a solution to the problem of low productivity and
competitiveness of the UK economy. As the two case studies will demonstrate, the state
is regarded as a political actor tasked with reforming and managing society and its
members in order to create the optimal conditions of corporations to thrive and, by
association, to contribute to the growth of the economy.
 
Automation and Productivity: The Categorisation and
Training of the Labour Force 
12 Political and economic tensions between labour and technology have been a permanent
feature of  capitalism. Karl  Marx (2004) argued in Capital that such tensions are the
direct  outcome  of  the  continuous  development  of  the  forces  of  production.  The
technological  advancements  of  industrialisation  and  automation  expose  the
contradictions between productivity and the constant fear of being excluded from the
production  process  and  between  unequal  distribution  of  wealth  and  belief  in  the
legitimacy of capitalism as a particular socio-political order. A logical step into this
inquiry  would  be  to  identify  the  workers  and,  more  specifically,  the  social  classes
mostly affected by technological advancements. Human labour has always been under
threat by industrialisation, automation and, more recently, with robotics and AI. Even
though  processes  of  technological  advancement  have  been  at  the  forefront  of
arguments about efficiency, productivity and economic growth, they have now been
incorporated into debates about the future of capitalism itself. According to Streeck
(2016),  capitalism’s  existential  crisis  can  be  explained  by  two  distinctive,  yet
interrelated, phenomena: first, the processes of replacing human labour are steadfast
and largely  unopposed;  second,  the target  of  automation has now shifted from the
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manual working class to the middle class to the defenders of an economic system based
on  private  property,  market  economy  and  entrepreneurial  activity.  Robots  and
automation  might  render  a  significant  percentage  of  jobs  obsolete,  but  their  sole
purpose is to minimise taxation and maximise profits. 
13 Does capitalism demarcate new battle lines between workers and robots? Is it possible
for  contemporary  capitalism  to  survive  without  the  support  of  wage  earners?  The
driverless car is one of the most indicative examples for communicating both anxieties
about  labour  displacement  and  a  sense  of  optimism  about  a  productive,  growing
economy. If cars can drive themselves, what will happen to professional drivers? Will
they be permanently displaced by technological advancements? The UK government’s
2017  Autumn  Budget  illustrates  the  need  for  more  automation  and  autonomous
technology in order to combat chronic low productivity. Relying on figures from the
OECD, the budget states that productivity growth amongst developed economies has
been  at  least  1  percentage  point  slower  since  2008  than  in  the  preceding  decade.
However, in the UK, the Autumn Budget points out that the slow-down has been more
severe  and productivity  growth averages  0.1% since  2008  compared  to  2.1% in  the
preceding decade (HM Treasury 2017: 11). One of the main arguments of the Autumn
Budget (2017) is that “an economy driven by innovation will place the UK as a world
leader in new technologies such as Artificial intelligence (AI), immersive technology,
driverless cars, life sciences and FinTech” (HM Treasury 2017: 43). A significant part of
this  new  technology  and  innovation  agenda  deals  with  what  the  government  calls
“connected  and  autonomous  vehicles  (CAVS)”.  The  government  wants  to  see
autonomous, self-driving cars on UK roads by 2021. This ambition will come to fruition
through changes in the regulatory framework for testing autonomous vehicles without
human operators, and through the adjustment of present and future road networks to
support these vehicles. In a subsequent interview, Philip Hammond, the Chancellor of
the  Exchequer,  predicted that  a  million British  workers  would have to  retrain  and
acquire a new set of professional skills to be employed in new jobs created in this new
economy. “It is going to revolutionise our lives, it is going to revolutionise the way we
work. And for some people this will be very challenging”.1 
14 The ambition to populate roads with driverless cars extends to the transportation of
goods.  While  corporations  such  as  Google  and  Toyota  have  been  active  in  the
development  of  cars  which  will  revolutionise  work  and  everyday  life,  lorry
manufacturers  are  developing  similar  technologies  aiming  at  minimising  costs  in
transporting goods. “Labour accounts for up to 45 per cent of total road freight cost”
(International  Transport  Forum  2017:  9)  and  driverless  lorries  will  redefine  profit
margins and ultimately redefine the rules of competition. As a result, up to 4.4 million
of the 6.4 million professional trucker jobs in the US and Europe could be eliminated by
autonomous technology (ibid.:  7).  Even though the report asserts the resilience and
adaptability of the work force under consideration, it concludes that their relatively
low education level would be almost prohibitive for acquiring new and diverse training
skills and knowledge. 
15 The links between automation, education and labour displacement are further explored
in  a  report  published  by  PricewaterhouseCoopers  (Berriman  2017).  The  report
emphasises the potential loss of jobs due to accelerated automation and predicts that
30% of jobs in the UK could potentially be at high risk by the early 2030s, compared
with 38% in the US, 35% in Germany and 21% in Japan (Berriman 2017). According to
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the report, employment sectors such as “transport and storage”, “manufacturing” and
“wholesale and retail” are more exposed to the risks of automation and subsequent loss
of jobs,  whereas “health and social  care” appears to be immune to automation and
robotics. The figures presented by the report largely depend on the educational level of
workers.  Workers with undergraduate or higher degrees will  be better equipped to
adapt to a new economy and labour market, while for workers with GCSEs or no formal
qualifications automation presents a clear threat to their employment prospects. The
report argues that labour displacement can be managed by the proliferation of new
jobs created by new technologies and by (re)training initiatives for workers in order to
acquire the right skills for a challenging new labour market. 
16 Governmental intervention in the domains of education and vocational training are at
the forefront of the report of the Future of Work Commission (2017). Falling real wages
and  increasing  inequality  are  considered  by  the  report  to  be  some  of  the  most
significant  by-products  of  automation.  On the whole,  the report  welcomes the new
technological shift towards automation, robotics and AI due to its potential to decrease
working hours, increase productivity and contribute to higher standards of living. Such
potential can only be realised with policy intervention in the areas of “good work”;
“skills  for  the  future”;  “innovation”;  “corporate  governance”;  “labour  rights”;  and
“ethics”. The report advocates a stronger and more active role for the state in the new
economy in order to assess the quality of the work that workers are engaged with, and
the equal distribution of wealth. Lifelong learning and the establishment of education
trusts in conjunction with new tax rates for incentivising business to invest more in
their workforce will position the state as an active actor in the management of the new
economy. 
17 Skills, training and education, innovation and investment appear to be constant themes
in the analysis of technological displacement. The “Future of Jobs” report published by
the  World  Economic  Forum  does  not  necessarily  diverge  from  these  themes,  yet
introduces  the  issue  of  diversity  as  another  defence  strategy  for  avoiding  skills
shortage in an economy dominated by automation. In what the report refers to as the
“Fourth Industrial Revolution”, human resources departments will have to be able to
analyse skills gaps and determine how to align their workforce to meet present and
future challenges (Gray 2016). The report states that diversity in the workplace will
increase  in  significance as  corporations and smaller  businesses  will  have to  recruit
workers from across the world to fill gaps in skills specific to technological innovation
and automation. 
18 Overall, the above-mentioned reports shift the focus from the integration of workers as
a collective into a  new economic and social  order,  to a  “project  of  self-realisation”
(Boltanski  and  Chiapello  2007:  217)  by  establishing  links  between  performance,
knowledge and the ability to remain employable in the new, and more demanding,
corporate  environment.  As  a  result,  the  flexibility  that  all  reports  implicitly  or
explicitly  demand through  retraining  and  acquiring  new  skills  transfers  the
uncertainty  of  insecure  employment  from the corporation to  the  actual  workforce.
Lack  of  access  to  retraining  programmes  or  the  unwillingness  of  corporations  to
provide such programmes will inevitably lead to the casualisation of a big proportion of
the current labour force. The new technological displacement is presented by these
reports  as  an  unstoppable  force  whose  missions  are  primarily  to  address  low
productivity and ,secondly, to categorise the current and future labour force according
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to  the  binary  oppositions  of  competent  and  incompetent,  trained  and  untrained,
educated  and  uneducated,  flexible  and  inflexible.  The  overwhelming  emphasis  on
training and future investment also indicates the selection process of corporations and
other businesses regarding their labour force. Access to training will be offered to those
“whose  disposition  is  deemed  sufficiently  promising  to  justify  the  investment”
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 237). Once retrained, workers need to fulfil the promise
of  a  productive,  automated  and  growing  economy,  and  will  be  indebted  to  the
corporation for maintaining their employment status. The anxiety over employment
and skills is designed to prevent workers from challenging the structures of the new
economy either as individuals or as part of a union. 
19 As the alliance between state and corporation for the sustainability of the competitive
labour market depends on the marginalisation of workers both as productive force and
as active agents capable of challenging economic norms and structures, new contested
sites emerge around the issues of workers’ unionisation, working hours, income and
taxation.  Despite  the  fact  that  trade  union  membership  is  at  an  all-time  low
(Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2018), precarious work and
social  insecurity  have generated action by smaller  unions  such as  the  Independent
Workers  Union  (IWGB)  and  the  Industrial  Workers  of  the  World  (IWW),  and  in
collaboration with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) have enabled precarious workers
at the intersections of automation and self-employment to share their experiences and
take part in legal battles over employment status and bargaining powers (Trades Union
Congress  2017;  Chakelian 2018).  By  acknowledging  the  automation  of  work  as  an
irreversible process, unions demand the spreading of the benefits of new technologies.
Secure  employment,  a  reduced  number  of  working  hours  and  the  introduction  of
Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a basic wage paid to every citizen constitute a new set
of demands for a new type of society. Even though the description and implementation
of UBI are subject to theoretical and policy debates (Srnicek and Williams 2016) unions
and supportive policy-makers hope to set in motion a radical reconsideration of policy
over the categorisation of citizens into employed and unemployed, skilled or unskilled.
Due to the shrinking workforce, the implementation of UBI will not necessarily rely on
income tax but on the actual taxation of the agents of automation, namely corporations
and their technological infrastructures.
 
The Use of Immigrant Labour
20 Arguments about productivity and economic growth are not limited to the discourse of
automation and technological  displacement.  Rather,  they extend to  the  mobility  of
labour and immigrant labour in particular. Immigration has either been articulated by
media and political discourses as labour mobility that needs to be assessed according to
a cost-benefit analysis, or as a socio-cultural process capable of re-defining the limits of
national identity, belonging, and of dominant cultural patterns. More specifically, in
order for immigration to be considered positive, the input of immigrant workers needs
to  surpass  their  impact  on  public  services  such  as  housing,  health  and  education.
However, for the Leave campaign and its affiliated media, the impact of immigration on
the dominant definitions of national culture and social cohesion became a powerful
persuasive  tool  for  the  lead-up  to  the  UK’s  decision  to  disentangle  itself  from  the
structures, laws and policies of the EU (Pencheva and Maronitis 2018). In anticipation of
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the communication of a concise post-Brexit immigration policy, the Migration Advisory
Committee  (2018)  published  a  report  outlining  a  socio-economic  structure  that
supports  economic  growth  while  recognising  the  predominantly  Eurosceptic
electorate’s  anxieties  over  the  control  of  national  borders,  access  to  housing,
employment and welfare. The report argues for the need to offer visas to immigrants in
a tiered system based on skills and income in proportion to their contribution to the
UK economy (Financial Times 2018). However, such suggestions have been rebuked by
business who demand access to a larger pool of unskilled and low-skilled workers to fill
in vacancies in the construction, hospitality and haulage sectors of the economy. In
principle, as David Goodhart (2018) suggests in the Public Policy Exchange report on
post-Brexit immigration policy,  employers could attract workers from the local and
national labour market if they were willing to increase salaries and improve working
conditions. This would result in higher prices for products and services. Eventually, the
economy’s competitiveness would be compromised.  Present and future immigration
policies will have to reflect public anxieties generated by media discourses and political
rhetoric about the impact of immigration on cohesion, identity and public services and
at the same time to address the needs of the economy in terms of skills, salaries, and
overall number of the working population (Maronitis 2016).
21 The  prospect  of  a  new  immigration  policy  framework  that  would  enable  the
government to refuse EU immigrants the right to work in the UK, as well as forcing
employers  to  recruit  British  citizens  to  perform  jobs  previously  considered  as
unattractive, has led a number of thinktanks, political and business figures to defend
current  levels  of  immigrant  labour  solely  for  maintaining  economic  growth  and
existing standards of living. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research
(NIESR)  differentiates  between  “middle  range”  and  “hard”  Brexit  and  provides  an
assessment  with  respect  to  immigration  and  economic  growth  (Rolfe  and  Hudson-
Sharp 2016). In the “middle range” scenario where immigration falls by as much as
91,000 a year, the GDP per head will be 3.4% lower than it would have been by 2030. In
the “hard” Brexit  scenario,  the institute  estimates  that if  immigration were cut  by
150,000 a year then the annual GDP would be lower 5.4%. According to the NIESR, both
moderate and sharp cuts in immigration would not necessarily have a positive impact
on the wages of British workers employed in the most immigration-dependent sectors
of the UK economy, namely construction,  hospitality,  retail  and food processing.  In
particular, the “middle range” scenario would only contribute to a 0.5% rise in wages
whereas the “hard” Brexit scenario would increase wages by 0.82% (Rolfe and Hudson-
Sharp 2016). 
22 The NIESR continues its investigation into the impact of Brexit on immigration and
employment  by  illustrating  the  employers’  concerns  over  possible  free  movement
restrictions.  The  report  indicates  that  most  employers  believe  that  Brexit  and
restrictions of free movement of labour would exacerbate their chronic recruitment
difficulties and labour shortages. According to the report, these concerns are not only
about the quantity of workers but also about the quality of work they perform. 
Everywhere you go in the leisure sector you will see lots of people from Eastern
Europe. And it is not because they are any cheaper because we have the minimum
wage and we have the national living wage. But they deliver a far better experience
(Rolfe 2016: 8). 
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23 The  report  concludes  by  stating  that  the  inflexibility  of  British  workers  and  their
expectations for higher wages constitute their recruitment as almost prohibitive for
the future of businesses in a post-Brexit economy. 
24 Farmers expressed similar concerns over immigration restrictions. In 2017, fruit and
vegetable farms in the UK were in need of thousands of immigrant workers and as a
result produce were left to rot in the fields. According to survey data from the National
Farmers  Union,  more  than 4,300  vacancies  were  left  unfilled,  which  approximately
covers 50% of the horticultural labour market. The survey points out that 99% of the
seasonal workers employed in the sector are from Eastern Europe and 0.6% from the
UK. Farmers in the UK claim that the vote to leave the EU has created the perception
among  foreign  workers  that  the  country  is  xenophobic  and  unwelcoming.  The
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and a prominent political
figure in the campaign to leave the EU, addressed the concerns of farmers by insisting
workers from the EU would still be able to work in UK farms, but they would have to
get registered and sign temporary contracts in order to “augment” the horticultural
labour  force  post-Brexit  (Ferguson  2017).  For  the  Secretary  of  State,  one  way  to
reconcile popular demands for control of immigration with economic growth would be
to import seasonal workers according to specific demands in the labour market and
effectively reinstate the Seasonal  Agricultural  Workers Scheme (SAWS).  He explains
that  the  current  limited mobility  of  immigrant  workers  is  not  due  to  the  negative
perceptions of the UK as racist, but due to the growing economies of their countries of
origin.  “It’s  already  the  case  that  the  supply  of  labour  from  EU27  countries  is
diminishing as their economies recover and grow. So, in the future, we will need to look
further afield” (Hughes and Daneshkhu 2018).
25 Yet, a survey conducted by the Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers (2017) has
revealed that EU migrant workers are neither employed on a temporary basis nor are
they perceived as transient workers. They are usually employed and perceived by their
employers as permanent and integral members of the workforce. As in the leisure and
hospitality sectors, employers in the farming and horticultural sectors are reluctant to
employ  and  invest  in  the  training  of  workers  from  the  local  and  national  labour
markets. Preference for immigrant over domestic workers is usually explained by the
willingness of the former to work more hours, positively respond to flexible working
schedules, and live in the accommodation spaces provided by farms. 
26 Reports  on  the  state  of  the  economy during  and after  the  Brexit  negotiations  and
demands from professional bodies for sustaining the current levels of immigrant labour
in  the  UK  illustrate  the  importance  of  immigration  and  of  immigrant  workers.
Following Abdelmalek Sayad’s remarks on the social implications of immigration, it can
be argued that immigrant workers are only accepted as long as they are defined by the
work  they  perform.  For  Sayad,  “the  immigrant  is  only  a  body”  (2007:  213)  that  is
required  to  perform  certain  tasks  and  subsequently  present  her/himself  as  labour
power.  Outside  the  environments  in  which  immigrants  work  and  live,  they  are
considered “minors” who need to be taught the local customs and the demands of the
host economy and society. Sayad substantiates his argument on the singular perception
of the immigrant as a working body by distinguishing between body and head, between
working and thinking. Here, the implicit references to Aristotle’s “use of the body” for
defining the nature of the slave are too strong to ignore. Aristotle defines the slave “as
the human being whose work consists only in the use of the body” (Agamben 2016: 5).
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Agamben argues that Aristotle does not necessarily deny the slave’s human nature but
insists that the work performed by the slave is not human work. The simultaneous
exclusion and inclusion from humanity provides the slave with a special status that can
be explained as an act of legislation and of necessity. Agamben points out that even
though the slave is excluded from political life, his actual presence is an integral part of
it. “The slave in fact represents a not properly human life that renders possible for
others the bios politicos, that is to say, the truly human life” (Agamben, 2016: 20). 
27 Agamben’s reading of Aristotle enables us to perceive the socio-political exclusion of
certain  workers  as  a  necessary  condition  for  flourishing  economies  beyond  the
chronological confines of antiquity. From Hegel to Keynes and Beveridge, the presence
of disposable, unskilled labour with no rights and access to welfare, also known as the
“rabble”, is not an historical anomaly that has been or will be rectified by civil society,
but rather a product of civil society’s unresolved contradiction between freedom and
deprivation (Mann 2017).  For  Beveridge,  this  contradiction would dissolve with the
introduction of the welfare state and the subsequent re-understanding of civil society’s
purpose:  “Whatever  the  bearing  of  full  employment  upon  industrial  discipline  one
thing  is  clear.  A  civilised  community  must  find  alternatives  to  starvation  for
preservation of industrial discipline and efficiency” (Beveridge 1944: 300). 
28 While it would be extreme and controversial to draw parallels between the slave of the
Ancient Greek city-states and the low-skilled immigrant of the UK, it is worth noting
that  the marginalisation of  workers  and,  in  particular,  the permanent otherness  of
immigrants,  have been historically beneficial  to national  economies for growth and
productivity. Low-skilled immigrant workers embody a cultural, ethnic and economic
otherness  that  determines  their  position  in  economy and society.  They  come from
poorer  countries,  underdeveloped  economies  and  are  part  of  different  historical
processes,  which  are  sometimes  incompatible  with  the  host  country’s  social  and
political  order.  Up  to  a  certain  extent,  the  otherness  and  incompatibility  that
immigrants  embody are  desirable  qualities  for  the  regulation of  their  mobility  and
control of their rights. They find themselves at the bottom of the social and political
order,  due  to  their  perception  by  employers  and  policymakers  as  convenient  and
advantageous work accessories. The attempt of the UK’s Conservative government to
tame anti-immigration sentiments with plans to prioritise the inflow of high-skilled
over low-skilled immigrants has been refuted by businesses in agriculture,  farming,
hospitality and leisure businesses. Minimum wages, the willingness to do jobs British
citizens are unwilling to do and objective difficulties to form or be part of workers’
unions constitute low-skilled immigrant workers as vital components for the country’s
economic growth and productivity. 
29 The  route  to  economic  growth  and  productivity  via  the  exploitation  of  low-skilled
immigrant workers has been contested by the formation and subsequent action of new
trade unions such as United Voices of the World and Independent Workers Union of
Great Britain (2018). These unions address the pervasive precarious working conditions
in hospitality, care and domestic services and campaign for minimum and living wages,
dignified  and  safe  conditions,  and  access  to  legal  representation  for  all  low-skilled
immigrant workers. According to these unions, such actions aim at the integration of
low-paid immigrant workers in a labour market in which standard rules, regulations
and  rights  should  be  applied  to  all  workers  irrespectively  of  their  ethnicity,
qualifications and type of work.
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Homo Œconomicus: Constructing and Governing the
Subject of Neoliberalism
30 The discourses of technological displacement and cheap, low-skilled immigrant labour
normalise uncertainty and insecurity for the working population. On the one hand,
there are people in work who have to be flexible, responsive and always willing to be
retrained in order to  be employable.  On the other hand,  there are people who are
willing  to  work  in  jobs  which  are  considered  to  be  undesirable,  low-paid  and  less
secure. The uncertainty and fear communicated by the reports, policies and statements
are by no means an indication of a political and economic system in disarray. In fact,
fear and uncertainty are part of the motivational strategy ingrained in the “new spirit
of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). 
31 Fear and uncertainty as  well  as  the categorisation of  labour in relation to training
programmes, exposure to technological advancements and immigration flows indicate
that  neoliberalism  is  much  more  than  an  economic  system.  Foucault  argued  that
neoliberalism  is  an  all-encompassing  political  system  in  which  new  subjectivities
emerge  (2004).  The  ways  these  subjectivities  conduct  themselves  in  competitive
environments, and at the same time are being evaluated by the rules and standards of
competition,  reveal  the  political  character  and  aspirations  of  neoliberalism.  For
Foucault, neoliberalism is a political rationality that aspires to produce a permanent
consensus amongst all  those who operate within its  confines.  Industrialists,  manual
workers, employees, business executives, politicians, policymakers, and law and order
enforcement need to operate and conduct themselves according to the principles of
competition and of  the free market.  This  consensus requires  and at  the same time
manifests  itself  with the existence of  a  collective  subject  that  transcends class  and
status, capable of navigating under insecure and challenging political and economic
conditions. This subject is predominantly defined by the dominance of the market and
has been known historically as homo œconomicus. From Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson
to Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, homo œconomicus has been
the defining subject of both liberalism and neoliberalism. However, for Foucault, there
is  a  noticeable  change  in  the  understanding  and  actions  of  homo  œconomicus.  In
liberalism,  homo  œconomicus was  understood  as  “the  partner  of  exchange and  the
theory of utility based on a problematic of needs” (Foucault 2004: 225). According to
this conception, the market serves as a social space where participants offer what they
have,  in  exchange  for  what  they  need.  In  neoliberalism,  the  market  as  a  place  of
exchange is transformed into a place of competition where the participants are not
necessarily interested in exchange, but instead in “investing” in themselves as both
producers and consumers (Foucault 2004: 226). 
32 At this point, it has to be noted that the neoliberal homo œconomicus is not a subject
constructed  and  understood  within  the  limitations  of  structuralism.  Following  the
theoretical elaborations of Michel Wieviorka (2012) and Alain Touraine (2000, 2010), it
can  be  argued  that  homo  œconomicus  is  an  achievement  and  a  product  of  constant
struggle against institutions which seek to regulate the market and personal interest.
However, homo œconomicus needs to be reconsidered across the multiple manifestations
of  neoliberalism  and  the  relationship  the  latter  establishes  with  other  social  and
political  spheres  such  as  technology  and  immigration.  Wendy  Brown  suggests  that
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Foucault’s conceptualisation of the neoliberal subject needs to be updated in order to
capture new power dynamics between the individual, employment and the market. 
Put it  differently,  rather  than each individual  pursuing his  or  her  own interest
unwittingly generating collective benefit, today, it is the project of macro-economic
growth and credit enhancement to which neoliberal individuals are tethered and
with which their existence as human capital must align if they are to thrive (Brown
2015: 84).
33 Neoliberalism demands from economic actors to trade off their rights and liberties for
access to, and participation in, the market. At the same time, the state’s input is not
limited  to  the  design  and  implementation  of  a  legal  framework  that  allows  the
expansion of the market in all spheres of social and political life but rather extends to
the  minimisation  and,  if  possible,  the  elimination  of  all  opposing  forces  to  such
expansion (Streeck 2014). In addition to the transition from liberalism to neoliberalism
identified by Foucault, Brown highlights a new transition in the history of neoliberal
subjectivity. Homo œconomicus is transformed from a subject attached to power, to a
subject existing in precarity: job insecurity and labour flexibility; private and national
debt;  austerity  and  fiscal  consolidation.  For  Brown,  the  raison  d’être of  the
contemporary homo œconomicus is not necessarily self-interest but survival and sacrifice
in  a  political  and  economic  order  that  disregards  notions  of  social  security  and
employment stability. 
34 The present employment conditions, in conjunction with anxieties about technological
displacement, low productivity and the need for a flexible labour force with minimal
rights constitute homo œconomicus as the defining collective subject of neoliberalism’s
strength  and  fragility.  The  indiscriminate  exposure  to  precarious  living  conditions
functions as a disciplinary mechanism for all those partaking in the competitive market
economy delineated by neoliberalism. The way the competitive labour market affects
the  existing  and  aspiring  labour  force  creates  the  perception  of  permanent
employment as a privilege that needs to be preserved, regardless of the cost. 
35 Is it possible to speak of a social class based on the common experience of competition
and precarious working conditions? Is it possible to speak of a social class created in
the ruins of  the state as  the central  organising principle  of  both the economy and
society (Hardt and Negri 2001; Virno 2004)? At this stage, it is important to underscore
the critical role inequality plays in the neoliberal order. The competitive labour market
does not aspire to the creation of a level playing field of insecurity and exploitation. As
Hayek notes,  “people  in  general  do  not  regard mechanical  equality  of  this  kind as
desirable” (2003: 65), because it restrains the individual’s willingness to perform. With
this in mind, the experience of  precarious working conditions and social  insecurity
needs to vary in order to discourage the formation of a social class challenging the
neoliberal order and also to encourage individuals to increase their performance in
order  to  remain  in  employment.  Compliance  with  the  political  system  no  longer
depends on a strong state capable of protecting its subjects from lawlessness, insecurity
and external threats. Instead, the new art of governance involves the precarisation of
individuals  and  their  subsequent  hierarchy  and  relations.  In  the  absence  of  social
protection, precarisation needs to be regulated in order to remain politically legitimate
and,  more  importantly,  its  “extent  must  not  pass  a  certain  threshold  such  that  it
seriously  endangers  the  existing  order:  in  particular,  it  must  not  lead  up  to
insurrection. Managing this threshold is what makes up the art of governing today”
(Lorey 2015: 2).
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36 Precarisation, then, becomes not only the main governmental device of neoliberalism
but also an effective medium for understanding social order and hierarchies between
precarious workers. The normalisation of precarisation indicates that British society is
quintessentially governed through insecurity. The art of neoliberal governance consists
in maintaining a balance between the maximum precarisation of working conditions
with the minimum safeguarding provided by the state, such as (re)training schemes
and controlled flows of immigrant labour. Whereas precarisation refers to governance,
precarity refers to a specific order that groups individuals according to their exposure
to insecurity, and at the same time determines their rightful compensation. This is the
moment  of  the  fragmentation  of  the  neoliberal  subject  homo  œconomicus —  a
fragmentation that occurs along the dividing lines of national and foreigner, domestic
and immigrant. Even though higher productivity and economic growth targets remain
elusive,  yet  of  paramount  importance,  the  state  still  retains  the  obligation  to
discriminate  between  domestic  and  foreign  workers.  The  dynamic  relationship
between employment and unemployment, security and insecurity becomes an integral
part of the art of neoliberal governance. Governmental precarisation aspires to create
substandard working environments for immigrant workers with minimal rights and
lower  salaries  in  order  to  maintain  a  sense  of  security  and  certainty  for  domestic
workers and ultimately manage the acceptable threshold of precarisation in society.
 
Conclusion
37 The  discourses  of  technological  displacement  and  low-skilled  immigrant  labour
construct a narrative in which competition, precarious employment and insecurity are
normalised. This narrative is produced, disseminated and controlled by businesses and
the government, and occasionally contested by trade unions and individual workers.
Despite differences and conflicting interests, the government and corporations are able
to defend and promote the values and ethos of neoliberalism, as manifested in the
competitive labour market, by pointing out to the necessity of economic growth, ever-
higher productivity, and the country’s ability to compete in the global economy. This
article  demonstrates  that  the  construction  of  this  narrative  is  based  on  two
developments. Firstly, those two discourses aim at the de-politicisation of the economy
and  of  the  labour  market,  in  particular.  Economic  growth,  productivity  and
competitiveness appear as objectives that need to be achieved regardless of political
and ideological  inclinations.  To that  effect,  technological  displacement and workers
with  minimal  rights  appear  as  a  necessary  trade-off.  Secondly,  the  two  discourses
under consideration formulate a new collective subjectivity within the theoretical and
empirical  frameworks  of  neoliberalism.  Individual  workers  are  deprived  of  their
collective defences, and their sole aim is to survive in the competitive labour market by
re-training  and  accepting  lower  wages,  flexible  working  hours  and  substandard
working conditions. 
38 In  order  to  politicise  the  labour  market,  the  article  juxtaposes  the  discourses  of
technological displacement and labour mobility with union responses, and establishes a
theoretical and empirical connection between precarisation and neoliberal governance.
By situating homo œconomicus as the defining subject of the competitive labour market,
the article argues that technological automation and immigration are not inherently
progressive, instead, their character depends on the political organisational framework
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of  the  economy.  Neoliberal  governance  asserts  its  dominance  through  the
fragmentation and further categorisation of homo œconomicus according to nationality,
ethnicity,  levels  of  precarisation and state  compensation.  The contemporary labour
market as an empirical manifestation of neoliberalism becomes an art of governance by
simultaneously uniting and fragmenting its collective subject through the process of
precarisation.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  identifies  the  points  of  divergence  and  convergence  between  the  discourses  of
technological displacement and low-skilled immigrant labour and argues for the understanding
of a new model of neoliberal governance. New technologies, new managerial and organisational
strategies, and new models of exploitation emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis
in the UK.  What are the main features of  this  crisis?  The article  points  to two different yet
interconnected processes. First, due to demands for higher productivity and economic growth
the advent of  automation,  robotics  and AI  is  presented as  an irreversible  process  capable of
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producing a new corporate environment in which low labour costs and efficiency co-exist with
massive job losses, waning of workers’ collective defences and re-training programmes. Second,
for all the increasing popularity of protectionist politics and of demands for tight immigration
controls the need for low paid and low-skilled immigrant labour across several sectors of the UK
economy remains unchanged. Demands for economic growth render the presence of low-skilled
immigrants necessary as  long as they are subjected to the minimum political,  economic and
social  provisions  such  as  wages,  political  participation  and  mobility.  As  a  result,  low-skilled
immigrants must exist within a political and economic environment in which they are perceived
as useful and at times essential accessories for sustaining economic growth and public services.
The concepts of precarisation and precarity provide a useful insight into the underlying logic
that connects and differentiates those two discourses. In particular, precarisation becomes at
once the dominant mode of governing the population and the most effective means for capital
accumulation. In contradistinction to old understandings of government that demanded political
compliance  in  exchange  for  the  promise  of  social  protection,  the  neoliberal  process  of
precarisation increases instability and provides the minimum of insurance. Precarisation is not
limited to employment but more generally to the formulation of homo œconomicus as a collective
neoliberal subject living in fear and uncertainty. Precarity, on the other hand, designates a sense
of  hierarchy  amongst  insecure  workforce  and  the  compensations  they  receive.  The  article
concludes  by  arguing  that  the  dividing  lines  between  national  and  foreigner,  domestic  and
immigrant,  become  integral  notions  of  neoliberal  governance  for  differentiating  between
precarious groups and maintaining order in contemporary capitalism.
Cet  article  identifie  les  points  de  divergence  et  de  convergence  entre  les  discours  portant
respectivement  sur  l’automatisation  et  sur  la  main  d’œuvre  immigrée  peu  qualifiée,  pour
défendre  une  compréhension  nouvelle du  modèle  de  gouvernance  néolibéral.  De  nouvelles
technologies, de nouvelles stratégies managériales et organisationnelles et de nouveaux modèles
d’exploitation ont émergé à la suite de la crise financière de 2008 au Royaume-Uni. Quels sont les
aspects principaux de cette crise ? L’article met en exergue deux processus, distincts mais reliés.
Tout d’abord, en raison des exigences croissantes en termes de productivité et de croissance
économique, l’avènement de l’automatisation, de la robotique et de l’intelligence artificielle est
présenté comme une processus irréversible susceptible de produire un nouvel environnement
professionnel,  dans  lequel  la  réduction  du  coût  du  travail  et  les  gains  en  efficacité  sont
concomitants  de  suppressions  massives  d’emplois,  d’un  affaiblissement  des  protections
collectives dont bénéficient les travailleurs et de programmes de requalification professionnelle.
Deuxièmement, en dépit de la popularité croissante des politiques protectionnistes et des appels
à  un  contrôle  plus  strict  de  l’immigration,  les  besoins  de  plusieurs  secteurs  de  l’économie
britannique  en  matière  de  main  d’œuvre  immigrée  peu  qualifiée  demeurent  inchangés.  Les
exigences  en  termes  de  croissance  économique  rendent  la  présence  de  ces  immigrants  peu
qualifiés nécessaire, pour autant qu’ils bénéficient de droits politiques, économiques et sociaux
minimaux — salaires, participation politique et mobilité. Il en résulte que les immigrants peu
qualifiés doivent exister dans un environnement politique et économique dans lequel ils sont
perçus  comme  des  rouages  utiles  -  parfois  essentiels  —  de  la  croissance  économique  et  des
services publics. Les concepts de précarisation et de précarité fournissent un éclairage précieux
sur la logique sous-jacente qui relie ces deux discours tout en les différenciant. La précarisation
est devenue le mode dominant de gouvernement de la population et le moyen le plus efficace de
permettre l’accumulation du capital.  À rebours des conceptions anciennes du gouvernement,
dans lesquelles l’obéissance politique était échangée contre la promesse d’une protection sociale,
le  processus  néolibéral  de  précarisation accroît  l’instabilité  et  ne fournit  qu’un minimum de
protection. La précarisation n’est pas limitée à l’emploi, mais s’inscrit dans la formulation plus
large de l’homo œconomicus comme sujet collectif néolibéral vivant dans la peur et d’incertitude.
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La  précarité,  quant  à  elle,  désigne  la  hiérarchie  établie  au  sein  des  travailleurs  vivant  dans
l’insécurité, et les formes de compensation qu’ils en retirent. L’article conclut en affirmant que
les lignes de partage entre le national et l’étranger, le natif et l’immigrant, font partie intégrante
d’une gouvernance néolibérale qui opère des distinctions entre groupes précaires pour maintenir
l’ordre au sein du capitalisme contemporain.
INDEX
Mots-clés: automatisation, immigration, néolibéralisme, précarisation, homo œconomicus,
gouvernance
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